Michigan Law Review
Volume 101

Issue 6

2003

Toward a More Communitarian Future? Fukuyama as the
Fundamentalist Secular Humanist
June Carbone
Santa Clara University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
June Carbone, Toward a More Communitarian Future? Fukuyama as the Fundamentalist Secular
Humanist, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1906 (2003).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol101/iss6/22

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

TOWARD A MORE COMMUNITARIAN
FUTURE? FUKUYAMA AS THE
FUNDAMENTALIST SECULAR HUMANIST
June Carbone*

OUR
POSTHUMAN
FUTURE:
CONSEQUENCES
OF
THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION. By Francis Fukuyama. New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 2002. Pp. xiii, 256. $25.
With The End of History and the Last Man,' Francis Fukuyama2
established himself as the prophet of liberal democracy and free mar
kets, heralding their triumph as the only form of governance capable
of commanding legitimacy. Asked to reflect on his predictions a
decade later, Fukuyama concluded that the greatest threat to liberal
ism comes from biotechnology because it alone has the potential to
remake the human nature that liberal democracy was designed to
serve. Fukuyama makes a compelling case that biotechnology may
produce developments that should concern us; he is ironically less
persuasive in articulating a liberal-democratic framework for govern
ing the developments he fears.
Our

Posthuman

Future:

Consequences

of the

Biotechnology

is provocative. It establishes the breadth of the threat
Fukuyama perceives by linking four areas of biotechnology rarely
discussed together: neuroscience and the ability to determine the
genetic basis of traits like homosexuality or intelligence, pharmacology
and the transformation of human psyches made possible by drugs such
as Ritalin or Prozac,3 the potential to unlock the secrets of aging that
could usher in revolutionary changes in demographics, and genetic
Revolution

*
Presidential Professor of Ethics and the Common Good, Santa Clara University
School of Law. A.B. 1975, Princeton; J.D. 1978, Yale. - Ed. I would like to thank Bill Black,
Brad Joondeph, and Margaret McLean for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this
Review, and Armando Pastran, Jr. for his research assistance. I would also like to thank the
Santa Clara University Center for Science and Technology for its support.

1. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) [hereinaf
ter FUKUYAMA, END OF HISTORY].
2. Dean of Faculty and Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political
Economy, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins
University.
3. Fukuyama links Ritalin, one of a number of drugs used to treat attention
deficit-hyperactivity disorder, to "overt . . . social control," p. 46, and describes the antide
pressant Prozac as affecting "that most central of political emotions, the feeling of
self-worth, or self-esteem," p. 44.
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engineering with its prospect of designer babies. Examined individu
ally, each of these developments has the potential to relieve human
suffering. Considered collectively, Fukuyama argues, they threaten to
alter fundamentally human nature.
Given the breadth of the challenge, Fukuyama maintains that it is
essential to consider not just the propriety of individual applications,
but the governance of biotechnology more generally. His clarion call,
to weigh the implications of the decentralized, globalized, free markets
in which decisions on such technologies might otherwise be made, is in
many ways prescient. Such decisions produced the revolution in
information technology and information technology in turn acceler
ated the decentralization of power associated with it. Public discussion
of the implications of the new technology is occurring only now that
the information-technology revolution is largely complete.
Biotechnology, in contrast, touches more directly on people's
hopes and fears than the computing power of the next generation of
silicon chips. Biotechnology, after all, involves food, drugs, and medi
cines. It is no accident that one of the first of the alphabet agencies
that became the hallmark of the regulatory state was the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA"). Authorized in 1906, the FDA
appeared a generation earlier than the New Deal institutions associ
ated with government growth. It is similarly no accident that stem-cell
research, though still in an embryonic stage, touched off a firestorm of
controversy unlike anything in the computer world. In contrast,
Napster, though fully developed, implemented, and dismantled, never
commanded the attention of popes or presidents. Biotechnology is and
will continue to be governed differently as it takes place within a
heavily regulated marketplace far more dependent on government
funding and approval and the vagaries of public support or condemna
tion.
If Fukuyama is therefore right that biotechnology presents a
different type of challenge than information technology and prescient
in his call for an examination of its governance, his book nonetheless
disappoints in its examination of the framework for resolution.
Fukuyama's project is incomplete, and it is understandable that he
reserved a more detailed blueprint for other work. Less forgivable,
however, is his failure to confront the problem central to governance:
it may be necessary to destroy liberal democracy in order to save it or,
more prosaically, it may be necessary to curtail scientific exploration
and the application of lifesaving treatments to preserve human nature
as Fukuyama defines it.
The dilemma of stopping the threats to human nature without
derailing the scientific freedom and curiosity central to it arises from
two sources, one following from the way Fukuyama defines the threat
and the other from the intrinsic nature of biotechnology. Fukuyama is
concerned about anything that would undermine the human essence,
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which he describes as the sum of human unity and continuity (pp. 130,
172). He takes great pains to explain how an "ought" - thou shalt not
alter human nature - can be derived from an "is" - our existing
human nature establishes the values on which human institutions and
judgments are based (pp. 114-17). He never quite says, however, what
it is about human nature as it presently exists that is so valuable. In
failing to do so, his reasoning becomes circular: we should not change
human nature because doing so will necessarily change the values it
produces. And changing those values appears to be wrong even if it
makes us smarter, happier, and wiser - and inclined to value the
improvements.
Because Fukuyama's definition of the human essence is so elusive,
it can be used to oppose anything that changes us or our societies.
Modern sanitation or the transformation in women's roles have
arguably altered human society as much as Prozac or a revolution in
the treatment of aging. To prevent such broad-based changes, to
forestall effects that result from the culmination of thousands of
otherwise innocuous decisions, indeed, to return women to the kitchen
or prevent parents from seeking Ritalin for their hyperactive children,
requires a response as draconian as Marx's response to capitalism. If
human values reflect the human condition, then only preserving
human conditions in all their misery will preserve those values. In his
zeal to defend the essence of what it means to be human, Fukuyama
must necessarily be dogmatic in opposing scientific advances, however
seemingly benign, that threaten it. Fukuyama has thus become a
fundamentalist in his defense of secular humanism.4
The dilemma for governance remains even if we relax Fukuyama's
definition of the problem. Biotechnological innovations - the discov
ery of the human genome, new drug treatments for AIDS, gene
therapies - typically involve large initial investments in risky enter
prises whose ultimate products may be hard to predict. Once the basic
science has been developed, however, individual applications may be
4. "Secular humanism" is a philosophy that "centers upon human concerns and employs
rational and scientific methods to address [a] wide range of issues" and values. Fritz Stevens
et al., What Is Secular Humanism?, Council for Secular Humanism, at http://www.secular
humanism.org/intro/what.html (last updated Feb. 27, 2003). Fundamentalism, in contrast, is
often associated with religious fundamentalism, and it has been defined as "do[ing] battle for
fundamentals." Curtis Lee Law, WATCHMAN-EXAMINER (New York), July 1, 1920, at 9,
cited in KARL KEATING, CATHOLICISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM: THE ATTACK ON
"ROMANISM" BY "BIBLE CHRISTIANS" 17 (1988). The fundamentalists associated with a
particular religion insist on adherence to what they view as the essential elements of that re
ligion, and tend to be rigid and dogmatic in their interpretation of what the religion com
mands. Id. Fukuyama is a secular humanist, first, in that he relies on secular rather than re
ligious grounds for his conclusion, though he acknowledges that religious convictions can
produce the same results. P. 91. Second, his arguments are clearly grounded within a ration
alist tradition identified with the nature of what it means to be human. See infra Part II
passim. He is nonetheless a "fundamentalist" in that he seeks to identify and preserve the
fundamental or essential aspects of what it means to be human. Pp. 149-50.
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relatively easy and inexpensive. AIDS drugs that cost a billion dollars
to develop may be duplicated for pennies. Promising scientific devel
opments may therefore be relatively easy to derail while their more
questionable applications may be impossible to stop.
Although Fukuyama's prescriptions are mild ones - preventing,
for example, preimplantation-embryo selection to favor world-class
sprinters - his call to action is most likely to empower those who
oppose broad categories of scientific research (p. 211). Consider the
potential of stem-cell research. If the secrets of embryonic develop
ment will facilitate the existence of athletes with greater endurance,
Fukuyama will oppose the development. But where would he draw the
line: At prohibition of the basic research that might also lead to new
techniques to fight heart disease? At public funding of animal trials?
At implementation in humans? And more fundamentally, who is to
decide? Fukuyama's greatest failing in Our Posthuman Future is that
he does not convincingly address the question of whether governance
of biotechnology on the terms he advances is possible at all.
The obstacle to Fukuyama's project comes from human nature
itself. We are messy, stubborn, contentious beings, with authoritarian
tendencies that require constant vigilance - or so Fukuyama argues
in his other work.5 In a monograph that he wrote for the Rand
Corporation in 1999 that summarized the results of his early research
for this book, Fukuyama argued that information technology had
produced a rapidly changing, globalized, decentralized, privatized
world that had outflanked the possibility of government control.6
Yet, Fukuyama's project - to prevent the overuse of Prozac, the
prolongation of life expectancy, the. preimplantation selection of
healthier embryos - requires a degree of government regulation at
odds with the developments Fukuyama describes in his other work.
And while he personally favors nuanced determinations that distin
guish creation of bioengineered mathematicians from treatments for
dyslexia, it is not so clear either that those sitting next to him on
government-created bioethics panels will share the same views, or that
he can really stop the developments he opposes without derailing the
basic research that makes them possible.7 In a book that celebrates
5. See FUKUYAMA, END OF HISTORY, supra note 1, passim. Fukuyama characterizes
human nature as violent, pp. 154, 329, locked in a struggle for recognition that includes the
assertion of superiority and a desire for tyranny as well as self-respect, p. 184, and concludes
that only liberal democracy can keep these forces in balance, p. 338.
6. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA & CAROLINE S. WAGNER, INFORMATION AND BIOLOGICAL
REVOLUTIONS: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES - SUMMARY OF A STUDY GROUP
ix-x (1999).
7. Pp. 208-11. For example, Fukuyama, who rails against the use of Ritalin to treat
behavior within a normal range, nonetheless acknowledges that there are children at the end
of the distribution who are so hyperactive that "normal functioning is impossible," and "it is
hard to object to treating them with Ritalin." P. 210. He emphasizes the need to draw the
line between enhancement and therapy even when ambiguous. P. 210.
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and tries to preserve human nature, Fukuyama does not seriously con
sider how that nature will inevitably influence the shape and success of
his efforts.
This Review considers the implications of Fukuyama's work for
the future regulation of biotechnology. First, the Review maintains
that Fukuyama is almost certainly right that biological innovations
span a continuum of developments that range from vitamins enhanc
ing infant cognition to research unlocking the secrets of cellular aging.
Second, the Review argues that the value of Fukuyama's analysis
cannot lie in the pre�ision of his prescriptions, which are in any event
vague. Instead, discussion of human nature can contribute to a
reexamination of how technology can serve human institutions.
Biotechnology has potentially dangerous implications precisely
because it may transform us and because we are likely to make
decisions about its implementation on the basis of our most primal
emotions - hope, fear, love, grief, and the desire for immortality. The
insight into human nature most critical for biotechnology's future is
the one that explains how individually unobjectionable decisions may
produce collective calamities.
Finally, the Review considers. the prospects for a different ap
proach to biotechnology's governance. Many of the most controversial
developments Fukuyama describes - use of the nuclear-cell transfer
technology associated with cloning, selection of embryos with
desirable traits - have already been done in readily moveable fertility
clinics with a small amount of private funding from a determined
clientele. The potential applications with the greatest promise, how
ever - such as genetically modified plants that address the nutritional
needs of the developing world, or breakthroughs in the use of stem
cells to treat paralysis, cancer, or diabetes - require public funding
and/or a large measure of international acceptance. Fukuyama
correctly observes that we do not have the infrastructure necessary to
either promote or control these developments (p. 215). Whatever our
conclusions about the wisdom of the new technology, we are far
behind in developing political oversight capable of even keeping track
of the new developments' scientific, ethical, and social implications.
Reconnecting political participation with scientific innovation will be
biotechnology's greatest challenge.
I.

WHAT IS BIOTECHNOLOGY? NATURE, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS

Fukuyama's concern about a "posthuman future" grows less from
his understanding of science than his understanding of politics. He
sprung to international fame with a book entitled The End of History
and the Last Man, which argued that information technology had
helped spur the collapse of communism and a convergence toward
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liberal democracy and free markets around the globe.8 In Our
Fukuyama identifies biotechnology, and the poten
tial transformation of human nature, as the single greatest threat to
the triumph of liberal democracy. Fukuyama argues that:

Posthuman Future,

human nature exists, is a meaningful concept, and has provided a stable
continuity to our experience as a species. It is, conjointly with religion,
what defines our most basic values. Human nature shapes and constrains
the possible kinds of political regimes, so a technology powerful enough
to reshape what we are will have possibly malign consequences for lib
eral democracy and the nature of politics itself. (p. 7)

His definition is thus a political rather than a scientific or ethical one.
Fukuyama's political focus allows him to unite several seemingly
disparate developments. Underlying all of them is an increasing
understanding of how the human body works and how it can be
changed to produce not only better health, but different behavior.
Fukuyama picks four areas to illustrate the process. First, he considers
the "sciences of the brain" (pp. 18-40). He examines our greater
understanding of the link between genetics and behavior, and
speculates about the coming ability to identify, for example, those with
a "gay gene" and techniques designed to counter or eliminate its
expression.9 Magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI"), which allows
scientists to serve the brain in operation, similarly offers the potential
to identify individuals with the "wrong" sexual tendencies, and to
measure the effectiveness of efforts to "reprogram" them.10 Fukuyama
emphasizes that the challenge is just as great if the decision to imple
ment these technologies comes from parents choosing a particular
future for children as it does when the decision comes from the state
(p. 40).
Second, and perhaps most prominently, Fukuyama analyzes
neuropharmacology. Prozac and Ritalin provide his most cited exhib
its. Over 10% of Americans are already on Prozac, an antidepressant
colloquially described as a "happiness pill" (p. 46), and 12% of
Medicaid recipients between the ages of two and four were on stimu8. FUKUY AMA, END OF HISTORY, supra note 1, at xii-xiii.
9. Fukuyama refers, for example, to research on the importance of hormones in utero,
and considers the possibility that introduction of testosterone at a critical point in male fetal
development might counter the expression of a gene associated with same-sex sexual attrac
tion. Pp. 39-40.
10. Fukuyama devotes greater attention to the links between heredity and IQ and gen
der and behavior than he does to neuroscience, perhaps because the latter field has only re
cently been garnering attention. Pp. 20-40 passim. Nonetheless, studies of brain imaging may
contribute as much as studies of genetics to predicting human behavior. See, e.g., Erica
Goode, Brain Imaging May Detect Schizophrenia in Early Stages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002,
at A32 (stating that brain imaging may be used to predict who will develop schizophrenia
and to determine the effectiveness of early treatment); Wendy Kaminer, Gender Bender,
AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 9, 2002, at 9 (discussing gender differences in neurological
functioning).
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!ants such as Ritalin in one midwestern study (p. 51). No science
fiction, no new discoveries are necessary; we are already remaking our
psyches.
Third, Fukuyama highlights the science of aging, and the demo
graphic revolution underway on the basis of existing medical
advances. Life expectancy in the United States rose over the course of
the last century from 48.3 years for men and 46.3 for women in 1900 to
74.2 and 79.9 years for men and women, respectively, in the year 2000
(p. 57). Existing trends suggest that the median age in the U.S. will rise
to 40 by the middle of this century, and to 54 in Germany, 56 in Japan,
and 58 in Italy (p. 61). The race is on to find a genetic shortcut to
prolonging life, and research has already provided important insights
into the nature of cellular aging (pp. 58-60). If these investigations hit
pay dirt, life expectancy could double or more. These increases in life
expectancy and the decreases in fertility are already creating more
rigid, more conservative, and more female societies.
Finally, Fukuyama addresses the implications of genetic engineer
ing (pp. 72-83). Parents can now select which fertilized eggs to implant
based on characteristics such as the absence of a disease-causing gene
or the presence of a match for a sibling in need of a donor. With
greater understanding of the relationship between genes and intelli
gence, violence, and sprinting speed, parents may be able to design the
children of their choice (pp. 76-82).
Our Posthuman Future emphasizes that the result of these changes
is cumulative (pp. 81-82). With better understanding of genetics, we
can more effectively choose among possible offspring. With better
ability to choose, we may accelerate demographic changes - increas
ing height? - happening anyway. With wholesale changes, involving,
for example, the elimination or biochemical suppression of the "gay
gene," the organic causes of depression, and the physiological sources
of aging, we will have fundamentally changed what it means to be
human - and we may do so in incremental steps that we barely
notice.
II. WHAT IT MEANS TO BE POSTHUMAN: HUMAN NATURE AND
NATURAL RIGHTS
Fukuyama asks "Why Should We Worry?" What's wrong, after all,
with taller, smarter, saner, blonder humans? Parents and patients, not
governments, will make the choices. They presumably will choose bet
ter futures for themselves and their offspring. The sum of suffering
and disease will decline. The source of the cautionary note Fukuyama
sounds in opposition is, in contrast to the potential benefits of
biotechnological advances, maddeningly elusive.
It is also easy to lampoon. Cass Sunstein begins his review of
Fukuyama by quoting John Stuart Mill: "Nearly all the things which
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men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's
everyday performances."11 Ralph Brave, writing in The Nation, is less
polite. Fukuyama defines "human nature" as "the sum of the behavior
and characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from
genetic rather than environmental factors" (p. 130). He then argues
that what we want to protect is "the full range of our complex, evolved
natures against attempts at self-modification.· We do not want to
disrupt either the unity or the continuity of human nature, and thereby
the rights that are based on it" (p. 172). Brave is disdainful:
Human nature is defined by . . . human nature! To the extent that it is
capable of being located in our material bodies, it is all that arises from
our genetics. Any attempt at greater precision is a violation of our unity
or continuity - and threatens to expose the author's empty hand.
Through such sophistry, Fukuyama wishes to assert mastery over any
biotechnological innovation that he considers threatening, since he can
now arbitrarily choose when it is disruptive of the unity or continuity of .
the human nature arising from our genetics. Even a heritable cancer
could qualify for protection under Fukuyama's rubric for that which is to
be defended from biotechnical intervention.12

Fukuyama, however, does not mindlessly glorify the natural. He
does not even oppose all use of Ritalin. Instead, the content in his
message comes from the latter half of the sentence Brave quotes; the
harm Fukuyama identifies is that which will come if we "disrupt either
the unity or the continuity of human nature, and thereby [disrupt] the
rights that are based on it" (p. 172; emphasis added). The key to his
argument lies in the connection between human nature and human
rights, and that connection rests on two component arguments.
First, Fukuyama argues that "in the political realm we are required
to respect people equally on the basis of their possession of Factor X"
(p. 150). Aside from saying that Factor X is the essence of what it
means to be human, Fukuyama does not provide much of a definition
of human. Moreover, he acknowledges that we do not necessarily treat
existing humans equally, as we assign different rights to children than
to adults, to the mentally incompetent, etc. At the same time, he
insists such differential treatment does not indicate lack of a human
essence (pp. 173-74). Nonetheless, he clearly identifies that which he
fears. A "brave new world" of genetically bred Alphas, Betas,
Epsilons, and Gammas threatens the unity of human nature. Even Lee
Silver, who advances libertarian arguments in favor of most prospec
tive biotechnological innovations, is wary of the creation of a class of
"GenRich" humans so genetically distinct - and superior - that they
11. Cass R. Sunstein, Keeping Up With the C/oneses, NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 2002, at 32
(reviewing Our Posthuman Future).
12. Ralph Brave, The Body Shop, NATION, Apr. 22, 2002, at 25, 27 (reviewing Our

Posthuman Future).
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become a separate species.13 At the point where not just individuals
but groups are bred to be different, the premise on which equal
respect - and therefore equal rights - rests disappears.14
Second, Fukuyama argues that our insistence on and willingness to
recognize rights depends on human emotions. He maintains that "it is
the distinctive gamut of emotions that produces human purposes,
goals, objectives, wants, needs, desires, fears, aversions, and the like
and hence the source of human values" (p. 169). For Fukuyama, these
emotions bridge the gap between the "is" and the "ought." He
observes:
[T]here is scarcely a judgment of "good" or "bad" that has been pro
nounced by a human being that has not been accompanied by a strong
emotion, whether of desire, longing, aversion, disgust, anger, guilt or
joy. . . . When we unearth the tortured body of a political prisoner in an
authoritarian dictatorship, we pronounce the words bad and monstrous
because we are driven by a complex gamut of emotions: horror at the de
composed body, sympathy for the victim's sufferings and those of family
and friends, and anger at the injustice of the killing. We may temper
these judgments by rational consideration of mitigating circum
stances . . . . But the process of value derivation is not fundamentally a
rational one, because its sources are the "is" of the emotions. (p. 117)

·

Human nature is a source of rights because human nature
produces the emotions that define our objectives and motivate our
reactions. When we respond with horror to the tortured prisoner, our
emotions produce an identification with the victim, and a determina
tion to avenge the death or prevent the occurrence of similar wrongs.
Fukuyama argues that human nature, through these emotions,
prompts the moral opprobrium we attach to murder, and leads to the
creation of rights to be free from torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and
wrongful death. Change human nature, administer a tranquilizer that
allows torture to be viewed with equanimity, interfere with the identi
fication with the victim as an equal, and you will undermine the rights
and values that follow from the strength of the emotional response.
Prozac is as much a threat to human nature as genetic engineering
because it alters the emotions that define and shape our values (p. 46).
Our Posthuman Future resonates with Leon Kass's The Wisdom of
Repugnance.15 In that article, Kass, now the chair of President Bush's
13. See LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRAVE NEW
WORLD 4-8 (1997).
14. Fukuyama observes, for example, that "for believers in liberal equality, Factor X
etches a bright red line around the whole of the human race and requires equality of respect
for all of those on the inside, but attributes a lower level of dignity to those outside the
boundary." P. 151. While he resists the efforts of other theorists to ascribe Factor X to God
(i.e., to the creation of human beings in God's image and likeness), to Kant's emphasis on
the capacity for moral choice, or to any other single factor, he emphasizes the importance of
human dignity and equal respect as "the dominant passion of modernity." P. 149.
15. Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1997, at 17.
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bioethics council, argued against the morality of cloning partially on
the basis of our instinctive repulsion at the prospect of human-genetic
copies. Fukuyama's argument, however, is considerably more
complex. He does not maintain that any particular emotion provides a
determinate moral guide. Instead, he insists that it is the balance
among competing interests that explains the evolution of human insti
tutions. Fukuyama can argue that we have come to the "end of
history" because "there is a logic to human history that ls ultimately
driven by the priorities that exist among natural human desires,
propensities, and behaviors" (p. 126). Murder is "natural," but so are
the gallows. Human nature balances a desire for dominance with an
appreciation of the security of property rights. Even globalization defined as "a world order in which mankind's largest in-groups no
longer violently compete with one another for dominance but trade
peaceably" (pp. 126-27) - can be seen as the logical product of a
natural preference for positive-sum competition. Fukuyama's
most fundamental book may not be so much The End of History and
the Last Man, but Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of
Prosperity.16 Trust - and prosperity - rest on the creation of institu
tions designed to encourage untrustworthy beings to interact with each
other. Make them more trustworthy, and you will eventually remake
the institutions that protect them from each other.
III. WHAT SHOULD WE Do? THE GOVERNANCE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY
Fukuyama's argument is clever, distinctive, and very thin. If the
problem with changing human nature is that it may change our values,
why are those values special? Why do the values associated with this
state of existence matter more than those associated with another
state we may voluntarily choose? Without identification of the values
that matter most, on the basis of something other than the conclusion
that they are the product of our existing nature, Fukuyama's argument
becomes circular. Although Fukuyama himself offers carefully
measured proposals, the logic of his argument supports those who
would limit promising biotechnology research now because of any
future change they can envision. If, for example, daily aspirin contrib
utes to longevity or vaccinations limit infant mortality, they too may
have political effects that justify their restriction. Indeed, as conserva
tive commentators insistently point out, a changing economy has
transformed women's roles - and corresponding family values - at

16. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF POSTERITY
(1995).

1916

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1906

least as fundamentally as Prozac, Ritalin, or the genetic engineering
on the immediate horizon.'7
The fog at the core of Fukuyama's argument is particularly
pernicious because he fails to develop the connection between any
particular avenue of research and the harm he envisions. Genetic
engineering, for example, is probably the potential development with
the broadest consensus against its implementation. Science-fiction
writers as long ago as H.G. Wells could envision the breeding of
human strains so distinct they become different species.18 Fukuyama
fears discoveries that may identify a genetic basis for intelligence or
criminality almost as much. The existing genetic lottery creates a real
life form of Rawls's original position.19 Even if, as a matter of statisti
cal probability, the offspring of elite parents are more likely to share
their elite characteristics than are the general population, the parents
cannot be sure their genetic gifts will be passed on, and they cannot be
certain that advantageous results are the product of inheritance as
opposed to environment. If parents could guarantee offspring with the
right gene combinations, or if they could determine in advance that it
is futile to train a child who lacks the gene for world-class-sprinting
speed, existing societal divisions might be exacerbated. The research
thought likely to contribute to such a result, however, might also
produce the opposite effect.
Consider the rapidly growing body of information about the
genetic basis of disease. Scientists trace families with hereditary forms
of illness such as breast cancer. By comparing relatives with the
disease to those without, they attempt to isolate the relevant genes or
chromosomes. Sometimes, identification of the genetic culprit leads to
abortion-based genetic screening or preventive measures such as
mastectomies for the healthy. In other cases, however, identifying a
particular disease-causing chromosome may lead to the discovery of
the underlying mechanism causing the illness. If, for example, the
relevant gene produces (or fails to produce) a particular protein, iden
tification of that protein may be critical in fighting the disease, and

17. Compare JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND
REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (2000), with FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT
DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999).
Fukuyama, although perceptive in his discussion of the importance of norm formation to
human nature, concluded with a mechanistic call for a return to traditional-family values
without systematic recognition of the effect of changing women's roles on how those values
are reached. Id. at x.
18. H.G. WELLS, THE TIME MACHINE (1895); see also ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW
WORLD (1946).

19. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (describing original position as an
imagined state in which people bargain without knowing their individual characteristics such
as race, wealth, or gender).
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it may lead to more effective treatments for both the genetic and
nongenetic forms of the cancer.20
The same thing may ultimately be true for more complex traits
such as intelligence. Scientists may discover that a particular gene
combination is associated with superior mathematical reasoning be
cause of its contribution to the biochemical development of the brain.
This could lead to the deliberate breeding of the mathematicians of
the twenty-third century. It might also lead to early childhood inter
ventions that enhance the mathematical functioning of the average
child. Identification of the genetic sources of intelligence is the devel
opment that most causes thoughtful observers to be wary. Yet, the
result of such discoveries in the long run could conceivably increase
equality in a manner similar to vaccinations (which compensate for the
unequal genetic distribution of disease resistance), universal public
education (which in some cases mitigates and in other cases exacer
bates natural differences in ability), or the rapidly increasing under
standing of the physiology of dyslexia (facilitating more accurate iden
tification of dyslexics and new teaching strategies that increase
dyslexics' success in learning to read).
All biological advances have potentially differential effects for
society. Discoveries about the links between nutrition, sanitation, and
human flourishing, for example, first brought advantages to the elites,
and continue to be a major source of inequality between the devel
oped and the developing world. Few would argue, however, that the
response ought to be to restrict sanitation in London as opposed to
mounting a public-health campaign in Calcutta. If the most critical
human-political value is equal dignity and respect, and if selective
breeding is the potential scientific advance that most threatens it,
there may still be no necessary connection between any particular line
of research and the feared outcome.
Fukuyama concentrates his energies in Our Posthuman Future on
identification of the evils he fears, and construction of a revitalized
natural-law justification for opposing them. He then encourages us to
"think about the design of institutions that can make and enforce
regulations on, for example, the use of preimplantation diagnosis and
screening for therapeutic rather than enhancement purposes, and how
those institutions can be extended internationally" (p. 211). Curiously,
though, he does not develop the critique of human motivation and
decisionmaking that has been the hallmark of his earlier work. And it
is how biotechnological decisions are likely to be implemented, rather

2 0. For a recent example of this, see Lara Jakes Jordan, Brain Defect Study Finds
Mutation, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 1, 2 002 , LEXIS, Academic Universe, N.Y. Times
Library (stating that a newly discovered fatal-gene mutation, found only in Amish newborns,
could be a major first step toward helping scientists prevent brain defects in babies
worldwide).
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than identification of the slippery slope of possible calamities, that of
fers the greatest hope of designing appropriate structures for govern
ance.
Let us take, for example, use of the technology associated with
genetic transfer. Scientists cloned Dolly the sheep by taking an egg
from the womb of a sheep, destroying its nucleus, and replacing the
egg nucleus with one from an adult sheep cell.21 The new egg was
transplanted into the womb of a sheep who gave birth to an animal
with the same nuclear DNA as the adult. Now compare two other
forms of genetic transfer:
- In the first, scientists extract the nucleus from the egg of a
fertility patient, insert it into a donor egg whose nucleus has been
removed, and add sperm from the patient's partner. The result is a
fertilized egg, implanted in the patient's womb that produces a child
genetically related to three parents: it has nuclear DNA from the
intended mother and father, and mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)22
from the woman who donated the egg.23 This procedure permits a
fertility patient with deteriorating cytoplasm or defective mtDNA to
bear a healthy child.24 It also involves a germline-genetic alteration.25
The child will pass on mitochondrial DNA from the donor to her
offspring.

21. See

SILVER, supra note 13, at 107-10.

22. DNA occurs in two places: the cell nucleus, and the cytoplasm surrounding the nu

cleus. The nuclear DNA creates a person's inheritable traits. The cytoplasm contains
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), which, according to evolutionary theory, originated from a
mitochondrian, a foreign cell capable of energy production that invaded the one-celled
organism from which we descended. Subsequently, the two cells formed a symbiotic rela
tionship because the mitochondrian provided energy and the host cell became a home for
the mitochondrian cell. Since then, all of our cells have contained mtDNA, and rely on
mitochondria to produce energy. See John Jain, T�e Future of Assisted Reproductive Tech
nologies, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 435, 435-36 (1999).

23. In the first efforts to address cytoplasmic defects, scientists sucked 5 % of the
cytoplasm from the donor egg and inserted it into the cytoplasm of the patient's egg, where
presumably the donor mtDNA and the patient's mtDNA combined. Subsequent tests
confirmed that the baby "inherited" the donor's DNA in at least some of the cases where the
technique was tried. John Mangels, Geneticists Jump Across Ethical Frontier, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, May 21, 2001, at lA. Fertility specialists in New York then tried the
technique described in the text, and inserted the patient's cell nucleus into a donor egg,
whose nucleus had been destroyed. This technique, which involves the more classic form of
nuclear transfer often banned by anticloning legislation, should have produced a child with
mtDNA only from the donor. Erik Parens, Degrees of Engineering: Have Fertility
Techniques Overtaken Ethical Concerns?, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1998, at CS.
24. One reason many older women have trouble conceiving is that the cytoplasm in
their eggs deteriorates with age. Other women have mitochondrial diseases that do not affect
their nuclear DNA. See Jain, supra note 22, at 438-40.
25. Most people think of germline alterations as manipulating genes in the nucleus of an
embryo because mtDNA contains relatively little genetic material. Yet, switching mitochon
dria would make a permanent and inheritable change in future descendants. Jain, supra note
22, at 440.
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- In the second, scientists take a cell from a diabetic child. They
obtain an egg from a fertility-clinic donor. They destroy the egg
nucleus, and insert the child's cell nucleus.26 The scientists then permit
the egg, which contains the child's DNA, to develop in a petri dish
long enough to harvest stem cells that can be coaxed into becoming
pancreatic cells that the child needs to regulate his production of
insulin. The stem cells, a genetic match, cure the child's diabetes
without the risk of rejection. They do not, however, alter the DNA he
will transfer to his offspring.
The first example involves genetic alteration of a kind Fukuyama
- along with many ethicists and legislators - strongly oppose. The
second involves a less controversial technique, contentious more
because of its destruction of the developing egg from which the stem
cells are taken than because of its effect on the patient. Yet, the first
has already been done in humans while the second has not.
It is tempting to conclude that differences in regulation provide the
primary part of the explanation. Fertility clinics are at the frontier of
the medical profession, with virtually no federal funding - or
oversight - and relatively little insurance coverage - or oversight.
Universities, in contrast, rely on federal funding with all kinds of
strings attached, and pharmaceutical companies need to convince the
shareholders and venture capitalists who fund them that they can
produce a marketable product worth the investment. Marketability, in
turn, requires FDA approval or a measure of public acceptance that
would be jeopardized by insensitivity to research protocols.
The regulatory framework, however, is itself a product of the struc
ture and financing of the underlying industry. How expensive is the
basic research? Who does it? How far removed is implementation in
humans from the initial discoveries? How willing are doctors and
patients to try untested techniques? Stem-cell researchers working on
diabetes could also escape existing regulatory scrutiny if they were
willing to operate in decentralized, privately funded clinics. They do
not because of the different financing and motivation at play in the
two examples. The first scenario - involving mtDNA donation depended on the development of nuclear-transfer techniques financed
by large-scale agricultural interests, and then implemented in humans
by small clinics with a determined clientele. The British government,
for example, through its Ministry of Agriculture, provided 65% of the
funding that made Dolly, the first cloned mammal, possible. PPL

26. For a description of this process, see Nicholas Wade, New Stanford Institute Is to
Study Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1 2, 2002, at A3 7, which documents a research agenda for
nuclear-transfer process. See also Status of the Implementation of the Fed. Stem Cell Research
Policy: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 1 0-13
( 2002) ( Statement of Roger Pederson, Ph.D., Dep't of Surgery, Cambridge Univ.) ( describ
ing promising diabetes research in mice using embryonic-stem cells to produce insulin).
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Therapeutics, a Scottish biotechnology company, provided the rest.27
The goal was not to clone humans, or even to cure disease. Instead,
the institute involved in the research hoped to create precisely copied
animals carrying proteins valuable in drugmaking or replicating high
quality beef.28 Other companies, for example, have engineered goats
to give milk containing human antibodies that can serve as medicines,
and analysts speculate that a "single herd of goats may soon replace a
$150 million drug factory."29 With governments supplying the funds
for basic research, agricultural applications that increase farm produc
tivity or facilitate the production of new drugs are big business.
Once the basic science has been developed, however, its applica
tion to human patients may be a relatively straightforward and
inexpensive process. Little scientific innovation was involved in the
fertility treatments treating the mitochondrial defects. Implementation
required only willing doctors and consenting patients. The patients of
ten have an intense relationship with fertility specialists, with both
committed to one overriding goal - the production of a child.
Maureen Ott, the first woman to bear a child using a donor's
cytoplasm, told reporters: "When we were told by doctors that it was
unlikely we would ever have children, we were not ready to believe
that . . .. We wanted a baby so badly that we felt it was important to
pursue every option available."30 After four failed efforts at in vitro
fertilization, the Otts may well have felt that use of the experimental
technique was their last chance to have a child to whom they would be
genetically related. In such circumstances, it is easy to discount the
risks. Mrs. Ott, when interviewed after her child's birth, insisted that:
"I was never concerned about the risk of abnormality, based on what
we were told. To me it seemed that the risk was no greater than it
would have been in any birth for someone of my age. "31 The doctors,
however, may be less sanguine. Dr. Jamie Grifo, the New York
fertility specialist who has used nuclear-transfer techniques, was asked
why he had not done safety testing first in monkeys. "Animal colonies
cost a fortune to maintain," he said. And because there is a ban on
federal-research money being spent on embryo research, "we have no

27. Edith M. Lederer, Poll: Americans Oppose Human and Animal Cloning,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 4, 1997 (announcing that a $411,000 government grant would be
cut in half), available at http://www.gene.ch/gentech/1997/8.96-5.97/msg00187.html.
28. Id.
29. Juan Enriquez & Ray A. Goldberg, Transforming Life, Transforming Business: The
Life-Science Revolution, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 96, 99.
30. Healthy Baby Born After World's First Succes.1jul Cytoplasmic Transfer, Bus. W IRE,
July 18, 1997, WL, Business Wire Plus Database.
31. Lois Rogers, Fertility Doctors Create Babies with Two Mothers, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), May 16, 1999, at 28.
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research dollars."32 In the four years since the birth of the first child
using these techniques, at least one has developed a serious develop
mental disorder, and some researchers speculate that the conflict
between the donor and the patient mtDNA might have caused the
problem.33 There may be no way to know without carefully controlled
trials that the clinics lack the money to fund.
In contrast, stem-cell research involves high-caliber university re
searchers, using proven clinical techniques, including animal experi
mentation and human trials. The basic research, like that performed to
clone Dolly, can be enormously expensive, and lack an immediate
commercial application. Dr. Elias Zerhouni, Director of the National
Institutes of Health, testified before Congress that:
We are at a very early stage of embryonic stem cell research, and have a
great deal of basic research to conduct before we can unlock the poten
tial of these cells and fulfill their promise. . . . As is the case at the begin
ning of any new field of discovery, there is a shortage of researchers with
expertise in stem cell research. This dearth is currently a rate-limiting
step in advancing the progress of embryonic stem cell research. Simply
growing embryonic stem cells to the state where they can be used for ex
perimentation requires substantial knowledge, training and experience.
NIH will strive to make stem cell research as attractive as possible to our
most talented research scientists, whose creativity in developing investi
gator-initiated research will move the research agenda forward. 34

·
In addition, Dr. Zerhouni emphasized that there are many steps
required to develop stem cells from when they are first removed from
an embryo to the point where they become part of a well
characterized cell line ready for distribution to the research commu
nity. As a "first step" in that process, NIH has awarded $4.3 million in
grants to fund the expansion, testing, quality assurance, and distribu
tion of cells.35 Once the basic research is completed, preclinical studies,
including animal experimentation, will need to be done, and only then
will human trials on small, carefully . selected populations be
attempted. Under ideal circumstances, it could easily take decades and
millions of dollars to realize the beneficial results of such research.
And without demonstrated evidence of the safety and efficacy of such
32 . Nigel Hawkes, Baby Race That May Be.Too Fast for Safety, TIMES (London), Oct
10, 1998, at 4.

·

33. Shannon Brownlee, Designer Babies: Human Cloning Is a Long Way Off, but
Bioengineered Kids Are Already Here, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2002, at 2 5. Nor is there
any way to know at this stage whether the risk is limited to cytoplasm transfer that mixes
mtDNA from two different mothers, or extends as well to nuclear transfer.
34. Status of the Implementation of the Fed. Stem Cell Research Policy: Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 5, 7 (2002) (prepared statement
of Elias Zerhouni, M.D., Director, National Institute of Health, U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services).
35. Id.
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treatments, it would be difficult to justify experimentation on diabetic
children. The Otts may have been willing to try an untested technique
as their only way to produce a genetically related child; they should be
far less willing to try such a technique to cure that child of a chronic,
but not life threatening, ailment.
The contrast between these two examples illustrates the challenges
facing any system designed to govern the future of biotechnology. A
particular line of research, at a critical preliminary stage, may be
relatively easy to derail or simply to starve from lack of funding. The
results of that research, however, are unknowable. The research may
unlock secrets of the cell that hold the key to curing diabetes or
paralysis, or it may facilitate genetic engineering of athletes with faster
metabolisms.
Once the research is developed, however, controlling its use, lim
iting, for example, "preimplantation diagnosis and screening for
therapeutic rather than enhancement purposes" (p. 211) becomes a far
more difficult matter. Egg, sperm, and embryo selection, genetic
therapy, and drug use (steroids, Ritalin) can be done in a friendly
jurisdiction or in carefully concealed labs.36 In an example of "fertility
tourism," for example, Swedes now routinely travel to Denmark for
artificial insemination with donor sperm in order to circumvent a
Swedish law that requires identification of the donors.37 If the life of a
dying child or the ability to conceive were at stake, prospective
patients and their families would be willing to go to even greater
lengths to secure treatment. And if an underground practice devel
oped with respect, for example, to enhancing athletic performance or
permitting gay and lesbian couples to bear offspring genetically
related to two, same-sex parents, a whole community might arise
committed to funding, promoting, and concealing such activities.
Fukuyama acknowledges these difficulties, but he does not examine
the motivation necessary to make a new regulatory regime work.
Doing so will require consideration of two processes that go well
beyond Fukuyama's book and the existing discourse about
biotechnology. The first is the creation of consensus. Most existing
technological developments occurred without serious consideration of
the wisdom of their adoption. We have begun to wonder about the
implications of the revolution in information technology only now that
36. See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Canada Regulates Meth Chemicals, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct.
17, 2002, LEXIS, Academic Universe, N.Y. Times Library ("Often called the 'poor man's
cocaine,' methamphetamine can be made in bathtubs, on kitchen stoves and in car trunks
from commercially available chemicals. It normally contains ephedrine and pseudoephed
rinc, found in over-the-counter cold medications.").
37. Matthew Hill, Sperm Donors "Want to Keep Anonymity," BBC NEWS: WORLD
EDITION, Oct. 15, 2002 ("Across Denmark last year 336 Swedish women were given donor
insemination, which resulted in 81 pregnancies - 30 pregnancies more than in Sweden."),
availab/e at htip://news. bbc.co. uk '/Uhi/'health/2329675.stm.
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it is fully upon us. Biotechnology, on the other hand, as Fukuyama's
book illustrates, touches on deep-seated human hopes and fears. Ill
considered legislation might derail promising research at the
same time that more questionable activities may flourish by going
underground or abroad. The Swedes, unable to command respect for
their policy of sperm-donor identification, cannot prevent their
citizens from going to Denmark. The scientific community, which has
been appalled by religiously motivated proposals for prohibitions on
stem-cell research, is likely to have few compunctions about moving
such research to friendlier climates. Genuinely policing biotechnology
requires not just passing laws, but forging understandings capable of
winning widespread adherence.
Second, implementing moral and ethical understandings, if consen
sus can be forged, requires the alignment of incentives and the desired
behavior. Fukuyama observes that through the early nineties virtually
all biomedical research in the United States was federally funded (p.
214). That meant that the best researchers only undertook federally
approved projects, overseen by professional boards that developed
standards for acceptable practices. The biotech industry has since
doubled in size, with private funding upstaging federal efforts such as
the Human Genome Project, and more decentralized programs, like
fertility clinics, flourishing in areas too politically hot to fund with
public money. Infusion of large amounts of federal or foundation
grants to underwrite the research is likely to produce greater public
participation in the decisions about implementation. Care should also
be given to the development of private consortiums capable of devel
oping industry standards and seals of approval. But in some areas,
there will be no substitute for nurturing moral understandings at the
individual level. Creating internalized codes that not only bar, but
condemn, steroid-enhanced-athletic performance needs to go hand-in
glove with the line-drawing between acceptable and unacceptable use
of genetic knowledge to produce those likely to be the athletes of
tomorrow.
CONCLUSION
Whatever the failings of Our Posthuman Future, Fukuyai;na has
written a compelling book that rests on a provocative thesis. His most
important insight is that human beings are messy. We strive for recog
nition - and dominance. We can be violent - and compassionate.
We seek autonomy - and community. We are not intrinsically
trustworthy, but we seek to provide the circumstances in which we can
trust others. Politics, the state, the sources of restraint on state power,
rights, and the celebration of freedom and community all come from
our need to restrain our worst impulses, while encouraging the flour
ishing of others. We wish to extol genius, even when accompanied by
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madness, restrain violence without eliminating the capacity for
self-defense, celebrate creativity even while acknowledging that it may
interfere with community, and permit ourselves to live together in
close proximity with a minimum of coercion. The institutions that we
design to achieve these results depend on the nature of human interac
tions, and thus their shape fundamentally depends on human nature.
If we no longer seek recognition or dominance, if we eliminate our
tendencies toward violence and creativity, if we do not value individu
ality or autonomy, we do not need the institutions we have, and we
neither need nor warrant rights designed to promote the welfare of a
species that has left those values behind.
What Fukuyama most seeks to prevent is Brave New World.38 He
fears that Prozac may be a precursor to "soma," the drug in Aldous
Huxley's world that kept workers contented with their lot (p. 46).
Genetic engineering could produce Alphas and Betas, football players
and pianists who become different species. Brain scans may identify
the sexually deviant and justify their internment or exile. In the
process, we will have lost our need and demand for democracy. We
will not be equals, and we will have lost our willingness to demand or
recognize equal rights.
Fukuyama has undertaken yeoman work in articulating the
connection between human tendencies and human institutions that
has formed the core of his earlier work. What Our Posthuman Future
curiously fails to do is to develop the political economy of the biotech
industry in which these decisions will be made. If human nature is
what has created our current institutions, then Fukuyama must engage
with human nature in designing new institutions capable of advancing
his objectives. Once he acknowledges human nature in all its
complexity, he will face an insolvable dilemma: among the most basic
human tendencies will be the desire to circumvent anything he devises.
If the U.S. bans stem-cell research, Sweden or China may endorse it.39
If the world unites in opposition to cloning, the Raelians may finance
Caribbean clinics for grieving parents who wish to clone their lost
children. And athletes will try anything that promises to enhance their
performance. Our posthuman future may not be inevitable, but it may
well be beyond the ability of any individual or group to direct.

38. HUXLEY, supra note 1 8.
39. Indeed, Dr. Grifo, the New York University fertility specialist who helped pioneer
the use of nuclear transfer techniques to assist patients with mitochondrial defects, moved
his research to China after the FDA attempted to regulate such activities. See Antonio Re
galado & Karby Leggett, Fertility Breakthrough Raises Questions About Link to Cloning,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2003, at IA (reporting that a team of Chinese and American doctors
were expected to announce that they had created the first human pregnancy using a DNA
swapping technology similar to that which created Dolly the sheep).

